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“Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it.”
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
1  Introduction
The allegations that the former ANC chief whip, Mbulelo Goniwe, sexually 
harassed an administrative assistant working in that party’s parliamentary 
office has brought to light the immense power the special relationship between 
a political party and its chief whip bestows upon the latter.3 Of specific inter-
est is the consideration that, under certain circumstances, the nature of this 
relationship can result in vicarious liability for the political party if its chief 
whip’s abuse of political power results in harm to a third party.
This article investigates whether a broader application of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability can accommodate the special relationship which exists 
between a political party and its chief whip.4 Such an investigation, although 
* I would like to thank Ms Jeannine Pieber, Dr Gerhard Kemp, Dr Geo Quinot, Dr Karin Calitz and Prof 
Sandy Liebenberg for comments and discussions  Remaining shortcomings are my own
 Quotation from a speech held by William Pitt, earl of Chatham and former British Prime Minister, on 9 
January 770; see Bartlett Familiar Quotations 4 ed (968) 46
 Quotation from a letter written by Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton on 5 April 887; see Bartlett 
Familiar Quotations 750
3 The ANC National Disciplinary Committee, chaired by Kader Asmal, held a disciplinary hearing on 4 
December 006 to consider the three charges brought against Goniwe of which the first was the “abuse 
of office in the ANC and the ANC Caucus in the National Assembly to obtain sexual and other undue 
advantages from members or others”  The other charges dealt with his violation of the expected moral 
integrity of party members and public representatives, as well as the fact that his actions “provoke[d] 
serious divisions and a break-down of unity in the organisation”  After consideration, the committee 
found Goniwe guilty of the first two charges and expelled him from the ANC (see “Statement of the ANC 
National Disciplinary Committee in the Case of Mbulelo Goniwe” (14 December 2006) http://www anc
org za/ancdocs/pr/006/ (accessed 7 January 007)
4 The position of a chief whip of a political party in Parliament is english in origin  The political term was 
borrowed from fox hunting’s “whipper-in of foxhounds” and has been described by Gladstone as “an 
undefined offshoot of the constitution”  In the traditional sense a chief whip was the unofficial chief of 
the staff to the leader of a political party and concerned with matters of party management, with “the 
order of business” as main responsibility  Gladstone explained that “[i]n short, the Chief whip held the 
position of general manager of the party … [b]ut he was responsible to the chief, and not to the cabinet 
or (in Opposition) to any conclave of ex-cabinet members or other leading men” (“The Chief Whip in 
the British Parliament” 1927 APSR 59-5)  South Africa’s parliamentary system of government, with 
remnants of its english heritage, considers it the responsibility of the chief whip of a political party in 
Parliament “to manage other whips within the party to ensure that its members maintain discipline and 
good conduct and specifically seeks to ensure that party members speak with one voice on matters of 
policy”  Therefore it is a chief whip’s principal duty to realise party unity  See “Annual Report on the City 
of Johannesburg: 2002/03” http://www joburg-archive co za/city_vision/annualreport2002-03 (accessed 
8 November 006)  It must be kept in mind that the chief whip is also a member of the political party  His 
or her association with the political party as a member is voluntary  
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controversial, is warranted in the light of the constitutional values and accom-
panying rights of human dignity, equality and freedom,5 which are violated by 
acts of sexual harassment. As Grogan6 indicated: “harassment cases are not 
like the run of the mill vicarious liability cases.”
The article first provides a brief introduction to the doctrine of vicarious liabil-
ity and an overview of the magnitude of the problem of sexual harassment in 
our society. This sets the scene for a discussion of the problematic common law 
requirement of the doctrine of vicarious liability that a master-servant relationship 
must be established. Thereafter an investigation follows into the common law 
requirement that the wrongful acts for which the master can be held vicariously 
liable must be committed within the scope of the servant’s employment. Taking 
into consideration the review of the common law requirements and its applica-
tion to the special relationship under consideration, it will finally be considered 
whether the flexible common law nature of the doctrine of vicarious liability is in 
harmony with the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.7
The article does not mainly focus on South African jurisprudence, since it has 
recently been noted that previous South African decisions regarding vicarious 
liability rarely prove helpful in untried cases. This is because “many decisions … 
are based on stereotyped expressions and generalisations of limited value from 
which no logical approach can be distilled”.8 The focus mainly falls on vicarious 
liability trends in common law countries.9 As Calitz0 pointed out, this is espe-
cially necessary since traditional South African vicarious liability cases
“were in the past reluctant to hold an employee vicariously liable for acts done outside the employee’s 
authority and not in furtherance of the employer’s business … [and therefore] provide no guide-
5 These values are also granted enforceable power by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 996 
through s 0 (right to human dignity), s 9 (right to equality) and s  (freedom and security of the person)
6 “Vicarious Harassment: Employers Become Reluctant Insurers” 2004 Employment Law 3 6
7 996
8 Calitz “Vicarious Liability of Employers: Reconsidering Risk as the Basis for Liability” 2005 TSAR 
5 5  In Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 506 Nel J noted: “Soos algemeen bekend … 
wanneer ’n nuwe situasie hom voordoen het verwysings na vorige beslissings om ’n grensgeval probleem 
op te los, selde veel waarde  In die veld van middellike aanspreeklikheid was daar menige beslissings 
wat voorgegee het om te steun op geykte uitdrukkings en veralgemenings maar waaruit geen logiese 
benadering gedistilleer kan word nie  Steun op ouerige beslissings is ook problematies ” 
9 In Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 506-508 Nel J explained: “’n Benadering dat die 
middellike aanspreeklikheid van ’n werkgewer getoets moet word aan ’n onbuigsame regsreël negeer 
ontwikkelings gedurende die laaste paar dekades in die sogenaamde ‘common law’ jurisdiksies, nl die 
VSA, Kanada, die Verenigde Koninkryk, Australië en Nieu-Seeland  Ontwikkelings van die ‘reël’ in 
daardie jurisdiksies is natuurlik van belang vir Suid-Afrika omdat dit deur ons reg vanuit engeland 
oorgeneem is … [D]ie veranderings in die beskouings oor die erns en omvang van seksuele teistering 
[het] ’n ommekeer te weeg gebring in die benadering tot die ‘reël’ in die ‘common law’ jurisdiksies  
Die standaard toetse vir middellike aanspreeklikheid en die redes vir die bestaan daarvan is weer onder 
oë geneem, en daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die gewone toepassing van die ‘reël’ nie tred 
gehou het met die ernstige vergrype van seksuele teistering in die moderne samelewing nie  Dit het gelei 
tot beslissings dat werkgewers onder sekere omstandighede middellik aanspreeklik is vir die seksuele 
teistering van hul werknemers deur toesighouers (‘supervisors’) en vir die seksuele teistering van kinders 
deur persone wat in beheer van hulle aangestel is ” Nel J (525) went further to summarise the findings 
of the common law courts: the scope of the rule has changed through the ages to take into account the 
changing social and economic circumstances and should continue to do so; the rule has been adjusted by 
decisions of judges based on considerations of fairness and not by legal principle; when a new problem 
such as sexual harassment presents itself, the nature of the specific relationship in comparison to others 
should be analysed  Thereafter it must be decided whether, in the light of the relevant characteristics of 
the relationship, the law finds the unlawful acts sufficiently related to and falling within the risk created 
or escalated by the relationship to find vicarious liability to be present  See also Calitz 005 TSAR 5
0 005 TSAR 5
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lines, since sexual harassment would always be against the employer’s instructions and could not be 
described as being done in furtherance of the employer’s business and therefore not within the scope 
of the employee’s appointment”.
1 1 The doctrine of vicarious liability
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the maxim qui facit per alium 
facit per se (“he who acts through another acts himself”), also referred to as 
the respondeat superior doctrine, was regarded as reflecting the view that the 
wrongful or delictual acts3 of one person acting at the pleasure of another could 
be attributed to that other, as the latter gave the former the power to act within 
the scope of their agreement.4 Simplified, the existence of a special relationship 
between two parties resulted in A being held indirectly or strictly liable5 for 
the damages6 which C suffered when he or she was the subject of B’s wrongful 
actions (or omissions).7
In Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long,8 Fullagar J 
of the High Court of Australia declared, with regard to the common law rationale 
 Stevens “Vicarious Liability or Vicarious Actions” 2007 LQR 30
 Sykes “The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule 
and Related Legal Doctrines” 1988 Harv L Rev 563
3 Today “liability” rather than “actions” are seen as attributed to an employer  See Stevens 2007 LQR 30  
In John Doe v Bennett 004 SCC 7 para 7, McLachlin CJ of the Supreme Court of Canada explained 
that “[t]he doctrine of vicarious liability imputes liability to the employer or principal of a tortfeaser, not 
on the basis of the fault of the employer or principal, but on the ground that as the person responsible for 
the activity or enterprise in question, the employer or principal should be held responsible for loss to third 
parties that result from the activity or enterprise” (emphasis added)
4 Vicarious liability, as a type of secondary liability, is the preferred route in the situation under discussion, 
in contrast to that of direct liability, as “[v]icarious liability operates on a no-fault basis, and is predicated 
entirely upon the status of the … [political party] as … [a master and the] … consequent relationship 
with” its chief whip as the servant, while direct liability “relates to ordinary personal responsibility for 
conduct, and may be conveniently described as liability [of the chief whip] for … personal fault”  See 
McIvor “The Use and Abuse of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability” 2006 Comm L World Rev 68 88
5 Roederer “The Constitutionally Inspired Approach to Vicarious Liability in Cases of Intentional Wrongful 
Acts by the Police: One Small Step in Restoring the Public’s Trust in the South African Police” 2005 SAJHR 
575 578 pointed out that “[v]icarious liability is something of an anomaly in the South African law of delict as 
it is one of the few areas of delict in which one is held strictly liable, or liable without finding any fault on the 
part of the defendant  [seeing that you are held] liable for the conduct of someone else whose conduct satisfied 
the usual elements of delict (including fault)”  In Majrowski v Guy’s and St. Thomas’ NHS Trust 006 uKHL 
34 para 7, the House of Lords also proclaimed that “[v]icarious liability is a common law principle of strict, 
no-fault liability”  Husak “Varieties of Strict Liability” 1995 Can JL & Juris 89 3, however, held that it is 
not “transparently obvious” that vicarious liability is a form of strict liability: “[L]iability is strict when the 
conditions that need to be satisfied to obtain a conviction allow a defendant to be punished who is substantially 
less at fault than the typical perpetrator of that offense  In the absence of a judgment about the fault of the 
paradigmatic offender, no offence can be categorized as an instance of strict liability” 
6 This liability is usually expressed in pecuniary terms, but there are circumstances in criminal law and interna-
tional criminal law where a party has been held criminally vicariously liable for the wrongful actions of another
7 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (00) 400  In our law, as depicted in Minister van Polisie v Ewels 975 
3 SA 590 (A) 596-597, there is no general duty on anyone to act and consequently protect another from damage 
or harm, although society might feel that one is morally obliged to do so  The exception, however, falls on people 
with a legal duty to prevent such damage or harm from realising  In such circumstances an omission can also be 
seen as unlawful and punishable  Although actions usually manifest themselves in positive conduct, a person 
under a legal duty can act wrongfully by way of omission when he or she fails to protect another from harm  In 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 00 4 SA 938 (CC) para 6 the Constitutional Court, referring to 
the special protective relationship between the State and individuals, and taking into account fundamental values, 
found that there was a duty on the police to protect the public (as a consequence of the State’s constitutional duty 
to protect the public from human rights infringements)  The Court consequently, through extending the scope of 
“wrongfulness”, created a new category of delictual liability by way of omission where said duty is ignored  See 
also Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (005) 89-93  Throughout the article, reference will only be made to 
wrongful actions, but it must be kept in mind that such “actions” could also include wrongful omissions
8 957 97 CLR 36  
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for the doctrine, that liability was “adopted not by way of an exercise in analyti-
cal jurisprudence but as a matter of policy”.9 This finding is in agreement with 
Laski’s0 1916 statement that the “basis of the rule, in fact, is public policy”.
In the present day, the respondeat superior doctrine manifests itself as the 
doctrine of vicarious liability as a result of the existence of certain special 
relationships and the social necessity to hold responsible those who create 
situations of risk.3 With regard to the modern doctrine, Fleming4 stated that
“vicarious liability cannot parade as a deduction from legalistic premises, but should be frankly 
recognised as having its basis in a combination of policy considerations.”
These policy considerations take into account factors such as the risk of 
harm to others, fairness and the maintenance of good practice standards 
by employees, along with financial considerations as rationales for holding 
an employer vicariously liable.5 In 00, Major J of the Supreme Court of 
9 56-57  See also Hollis v Vabu (Pty) Ltd 00 ATC 4508; 00 07 CLR  para 86
0 “The Basis of Vicarious Liability” 1916 Yale LJ 05 
 The doctrine as found in South African law is of english origin and rooted in the Salmond rule  See Calitz 
005 TSAR 7; McIvor 006 Comm L World Rev 7; Grobler v Naspers Bpk 004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 55; 
Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 5
 Individuals are generally only held liable for their own wrongful actions and harm that realises as a direct 
consequence of such actions  The doctrine of vicarious liability (as a form of strict liability) deviates from 
this point of view in that it does not necessitate proof that the person, to whom the doctrine finds applica-
tion, personally committed the wrongful act (see Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc 00 SCC 59 
para 6)  However, “no defendant who is held vicariously liable is selected randomly; the principles used 
to identify this defendant are not arbitrary … [therefore] [v]icarious liability is imposed on someone who 
was in a position to have supervised and thus to have prevented the occurrence of the harm”  See Husak 
995 Can JL & Juris 5  See also Blackwater v Plint 005 3 SCR 3 para 69
3 In Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 30, McLachlin CJ stated that “[t]he idea that the person who 
induced a risk incurs a duty to those who may be injured lies at the heart of tort law”  
4 The Law of Torts (998) 40  Fleming elaborated as to the form in which these policy consideration 
emerge: “Most important of these is the belief that a person who employs others to advance his own 
economic interest should in fairness be placed under a corresponding liability for losses incurred in the 
course of the enterprise; that the master is a more promising source of recompense than his servant who is 
apt to be a man of straw without insurance; and that the rule promotes wide distribution of tort losses, the 
employer being a most suitable channel for passing them on through liability insurance and higher prices 
… [In addition to the] deterrent pressures … By holding the master liable, the law furnishes an incentive 
to discipline servants guilty of wrongdoing, if necessary by insisting on an indemnity or contribution ” 
5 Majrowski v Guy’s and St. Thomas’ NHS Trust 006 uKHL 34 para 7  Prosser & Keeton Law of Torts (984) 
500 (with reference to Baty Vicarious Liability (96) 54) also made certain observations concerning the 
rationale for the existence of the burden imposed by the doctrine of vicarious liability: “A multitude of very 
ingenious reasons have been offered for the vicarious liability of a master: he has a more or less fictitious 
‘control’ over the behavior of the servant; he has ‘set the whole thing in motion’, and is therefore responsible 
for what has happened; he has selected the servant and trusted him, and so should suffer for his wrongs, 
rather than an innocent stranger who has had no opportunity to protect himself; it is a great concession that 
any man should be permitted to employ another at all, and there should be a corresponding responsibility 
as the price to be paid for it – or, more frankly and cynically, ‘in hard fact, the [real] reason for employers’ 
liability is  the damages are taken from a deep pocket’” According to O’Regan J in the Constitutional 
Court decision of NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para , the foundation for 
vicarious liability can be identified as the following: “The rationale for vicarious liability is found in a range 
of underlying principles  An important one is the desirability of affording claimants efficacious remedies for 
harm suffered  Another is the need to use legal remedies to incite employers to take active steps to prevent 
their employees from harming members of the broader community  There is a countervailing principle too, 
which is that damages should not be borne by employers in all circumstances, but only those circumstances 
in which it is fair to require them to do so ” In Hollis v Vabu (Pty) Ltd 00 ATC 4508; 00 07 CLR  
para 35, the High Court of Australia noted that “[e]ach of these particular reasons is persuasive to some 
degree but, given the diversity of conduct involved, probably none can be accepted, by itself, as completely 
satisfactory for all cases”  Therefore the relationship existent between a political party and its chief whip 
cannot be excluded from the scope of the doctrine of vicarious liability, merely because these mentioned 
underlying principles to the doctrine are not tailor-made for the relationship under consideration
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Canada in Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc6 further, and perhaps 
more accurately, articulated that
“[v]icarious liability describes the event when the law holds one person liable for the misconduct of 
another because of their relationship.”7
Major J went on to explain that, although the relationship that exists between 
a master and servant (nowadays commonly referred to as an employer and 
employee),8 is generally the target of the doctrine of vicarious liability, “the 
categories of relationships in law that attract vicarious liability are neither 
exhaustively defined nor closed”.9
The doctrine therefore has a flexible characteristic which leaves it open to 
the court to identify new categories of relationships to fall within its scope 
when society’s political, social and economic atmosphere demands it. In the 
Canadian judgment of Boothman v Canada,30 reference was also made to 
the fact that placing a person in a special position of trust carries with it the 
responsibility of guaranteeing that such person is trustworthy.3 As a result, 
by publicly placing trust in a person who is thereby granted some power of 
representation, for example a chief whip, a political party is acknowledging 
to the public that their political, social and economic interests are not at risk 
when dealing with this trustworthy person. In Bazley v Curry,3 the Supreme 
Court of Canada further declared that
“a meaningful articulation of when vicarious liability should follow in new situations ought to be 
animated by the twin policy goals of fair compensation and deterrence that underlie the doctrine, 
rather than by artificial or semantic distinctions”.33
In 004, McLachlin CJ of the same Court in John Doe v Bennett34 referred 
with approval to the Bazley case35 and further emphasised that in instances 
where
“prior cases do not clearly suggest a solution, the next step is to determine whether vicarious liability 
should be imposed in light of the broader policy rationales”.36
6 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc 00 SCC 59
7 Para  (emphasis added)
8 Throughout this article I am opting to refer to the terms “master” and “servant”, rather than “employer” 
and “employee”  By reverting to the traditional terminology I wish to show that the relationship between 
a political party and a chief whip to be considered does not fit perfectly within the modern idea of 
“employer” and “employee”, but can be described as one akin to the relationship between an employer 
and employee  
9 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc 00 SCC 59 para 5
30 993 3 FC 38 (TD)  
3 According to Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 0, in Boothman v Canada 993 3 FC 38 (TD) the 
“unauthorized intentional infliction of nervous shock by supervisory employee on his subordinate found 
[sic] to invoke vicarious liability for the employer, albeit it based on statutory, as opposed to common law, 
principles”  
3 999  SCR 534  This was a case concerning the question whether a non-profit association could be held 
vicariously liable for a childcare counsellor who sexually assaulted children at a residential care facility 
where the association operated  
33 Para 36
34 004 SCC 7
35 Bazley v Curry was referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Jacobi v Griffiths 999 
 SCR 570 and KLB v British Columbia 003 SCC 5
36 Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 5  See also John Doe v Bennett 004 SCC 7 para 0
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Following this approach to the doctrine of vicarious liability, it will be con-
sidered whether a political party, acting through its chief whip in Parliament 
in the protection of the party’s interests, can be held vicariously liable for the 
wrongful actions (in the form of sexual harassment) of that member, regard-
less of the fact that the chief whip receives a salary from Parliament and not 
from the political party.
1 2 The context
At this stage it must be noted that this article deliberately focusses on 
political parties instead of on Parliament as the possible recipient of unwanted 
liability. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to Parliament, the political 
party has a closer relationship and more interest vested in its chief whip as 
one of its high profile and influential members as a result of the power that 
the party vests in him or her. Consequently, a political party also has more 
(political) control over a chief whip.
Since a political party cannot be viewed as the employer of its chief whip in 
the traditional sense, it would appear that the question whether a party can attract 
vicarious liability should simply be answered in the negative. More specifically, 
the situation under consideration does not fall within the ambit of section 60 
of the employment equity Act.37 Section 60(3) of the Act renders an employee 
vicariously liable if he or she failed to consult with all the parties involved and 
did not take the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged harassment and to 
comply with the provision of the employment equity Act. A possible escape 
route is provided in section 60(4) of the Act, which allows for the opportunity of 
attestation on the side of the employer that he or she took all reasonably practical 
measures to prevent such discrimination38 from occurring.39
37 55 of 998  S  of the Act defines an employee as “any person other than an independent contractor 
who…works for another person or the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive any remuneration”  
(Emphasis added)  Regarding situations where an employer can be held liable, s 60 provides as follows:
   “() If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of this Act, or engaged in 
any conduct that, if engaged in by that employee’s employer, would constitute a contravention of a pro-
vision of this Act, the alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the attention of the employer
   () The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary steps to eliminate the 
alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act
   (3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection (), and it is proved 
that the employee has contravened the relevant provision, the employer must be deemed also to have 
contravened that provision
   (4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee if that employer 
is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act 
in contravention of this Act
38 In terms of South African labour law and legislation, sexual harassment is viewed as a form of discrimina-
tion  American law also regards sexual harassment as a form of discrimination  See Grogan Workplace Law 
(2005) 179  According to Carle “Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A Proposal 
for Further Development of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile environment Sexual Harassment 
Cases” 2006 Duke J Gender L & Policy 85 09, this American “finding that sexual harassment violates 
anti-discrimination law stems from an implicit policy against the abuse of power obtained or held by virtue 
of employment, where such an abuse of power is implemented on the basis of the sex of the plaintiff”  
39 Ntsabo v Real Security CC 004  BLLR 58 (LC) was a sexual harassment case that warranted the 
application of the employment equity Act 55 of 998 and lead to the Labour Court holding the employer 
liable for damages  In this case the applicant endured unwanted attention of a superior (her supervisor)  
The sexual harassment resulted in her resignation (which the Court regarded as a constructive dismissal) 
and almost caused her to commit suicide  
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There are, however, other possible avenues which may lead to imposing 
vicarious liability in the situation at hand. Lessons from other jurisdictions 
dealing with volunteers and clergy create interesting alternative possibilities 
and warrant further investigation as South African jurisprudence has not had 
the opportunity to deal with the situation under consideration. Canadian and 
American jurisprudence40 has had to consider the applicability of the doc-
trine of vicarious liability in circumstances where a volunteer of a non-profit 
organisation or church4 committed a wrongful act. With regard to volunteers, 
Kahn4 pointed out the following:
“Volunteers are vital to our society … [d]iverse in their activities, volunteers donate their time and 
energy to such fields as … justice, religion … and politics.”
Because volunteers voluntarily associate themselves with political parties, 
the “employment” context of a volunteer is similar to that of a member of 
a political party. The chief whip of a political party is in fact a voluntary 
member of that party. Therefore the approach of courts that have dealt with 
volunteers within the scope of the doctrine of vicarious liability is relevant 
to this discussion. When dealing with such special relationships, courts have 
identified that the establishment of vicarious liability demands three common 
law requirements:
a wrongful act must be committed by the servant;
a master-servant relationship must be established; and
the servant must have committed the wrongful act while acting within the 
scope of his or her employment.43
The first requirement speaks for itself. It calls for the relevant legal principles 
(as jurisdictionally prescribed) to be applied as dictated by the specific facts of 
a case. The latter two requirements, however, call for specific consideration.
As section 39(2) of the Constitution places a “general obligation”44 on 
courts to develop the common law, regard will first be had to the scope of the 
common law and its possible application to the problem at hand, whereafter 
the doctrine of vicarious liability’s flexible nature will be considered within 
40 The emphasis will mainly fall on Canadian jurisprudence  Australian, english and South African case 
law dealing with the doctrine of vicarious liability will also be considered
4 At one stage charitable or non-profit organisations could not be held vicariously liable for the wrongful 
actions of their employees or volunteers due to their charitable immunity  In America, however, the 
idea of charitable immunity has now been abolished  For the rationale behind the abolition of charitable 
immunity, see Kahn “Organizations’ Liability for Torts of Volunteers” 1985 U Pa L Rev 433 437
4 985 U Pa L Rev 433 (emphasis added)
43 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 438
44 In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 00 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39 the Constitutional Court 
noted that the duty referred to in s 39() is of a general nature, “because we do not mean to suggest that a 
court must, in each and every case where the common law is involved, embark on an independent exercise 
as to whether the common law is in need of development and, if so, how it is to be developed under s 39() 
… [but] there might be circumstances where a court is obliged to raise the matter …”  Consequently 
there might be situations where the common law is flexible enough to usurp a new situation in harmony 
with the Constitution’s values, whilst in other situations s 39() might call upon a court to expand the 
boundaries of the common law and develop it “beyond existing precedent” so as to harmonise it with the 
Constitution  See para 40
•
•
•
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the context of values such as human dignity, equality and freedom underlying 
the Constitution’s objective normative system.45
However, to create an appropriate backdrop for the examination of these 
requirements, the importance of curbing the occurrence of sexual harassment 
first has to be considered.
2  The wrongful act of sexual harassment
A person is the subject of harassment when he or she is being attacked, for 
example by means of intimidation, in a manner that leaves him or her in a 
worried or troubled state.46 In terms of South Africa’s labour law, harassment 
is a form of discrimination.47 As pointed out by Garbers,48
“[f]itting harassment into the discrimination mould is a deliberate choice, made judicially or 
legislatively”.
This is, however, not the only legal avenue for a victim of sexual harassment 
as a civil claim in delict may also be brought to hold an employer vicariously 
liable.49 The plaintiff in Grobler v Naspers Bpk50 chose the latter avenue. In 
casu, the Cape High Court found that an employer could delictually assume 
the risk of vicarious liability for sexual harassment.5
As becomes apparent from a reading of the Grobler case where the Court 
considered evidence of the impact of sexual harassment on a victim, such a 
wrongful act (be it viewed as discrimination or delict) infringes on a person’s 
individual autonomy5 through the exercise of power by targeting a very 
vulnerable and personal aspect of a person’s identity, namely her sexuality.53 
Such infringement on individual or personal autonomy by way of sexual 
45 At para 56 Ackermann and Goldstone JJ emphasised that “[t]he influence of the fundamental constitu-
tional values of the common law is mandated by section 39() of the Constitution  It is within this matrix 
of this objective normative value system that the common law must be developed”
46 Procter (ed) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (978)  S (xiii) of the Promotion of equality 
and Prevention of unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 000 describes harassment as the “unwanted conduct 
which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or creates a hostile or intimidating environment or 
is calculated to induce submission by actual or threatened adverse consequences and which is related to 
sex, gender or sexual orientation; or a person’s membership or presumed membership of a group identi-
fied by one or more of the prohibited grounds or characteristic associated with such a group”
47 Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke & Strydom Essential Labour Law (005) 07  S 6(3) 
of the employment equity Act 55 of 998 prohibits harassment as a form of unfair discrimination
48 Garbers “Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: Different Approaches, Persistent Problems” 2002 
SA Merc LJ 37 37
49 Garbers 00 SA Merc LJ 373 n 7
50 004 5 BLLR 455 (C)
5 In casu a secretary was sexually harassed by a manager of Naspers
5 Albertyn & Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties of an Indigenous 
Jurisprudence of Equality” 1998 SAJHR 48 54 n  explain that dignity is an integral element of 
individual autonomy: “Dignity should be understood as enhancing the value of individual integrity and 
autonomy within a social world that enriches that autonomy though [sic] relationships with others and not 
in opposition with them ” 
53 “[T]he value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration  We don’t want to be alien to or at war with 
ourselves; and it seems that when our intentions are not under our own control, we suffer from self-alien-
ation … When an individual [declares that she has the right to live autonomously] she … is denying that 
anyone else has the authority to control her activity within this sphere; she is saying that any exercise of 
power over this activity is illegitimate unless she authorizes it herself ” (Emphasis added)  See “Personal 
Autonomy” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato stanford edu/entries/personal-autonomy 
(accessed 6 March 007)
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harassment can be the result of physical conduct,54 verbal conduct55 or non-
verbal conduct.56 The effect or (social) impact of certain forms of conduct on 
the recipient can also assist in identifying three types of harassment: quid pro 
quo harassment, sexual favouritism57 and harassment in a hostile working 
environment.58 It is the first of these forms of harassment that is of interest in 
the situation under consideration:
“[T]he quid pro quo harassment … occurs where a man or woman is forced into surrendering to 
sexual advances against his or her will – the reason here being the fear of losing a job-related benefit 
…This form of harassment usually occurs in a relationship of actual power59 in the hands of one 
party; a party powerful enough to affect job-related benefits …”60
Power, or the abuse thereof, as present in the mentioned type of harassment, 
is a constant feature in sexual harassment cases. As Zippel6 noted:
“Sexual harassment serves as a vivid example of heated struggles over sexuality, power, and gender 
equality on both sides of the Atlantic, because it fuses the issues of … sexuality, and workplace 
equality.”
Although sexual harassment can theoretically be viewed as a gender-
neutral term, seeing that both men and women can be the victims of such 
unwanted attention, the truth is that it usually materialises with the woman 
being the victim. This results from the fact that men in power and authority 
positions6 tend to view women in the workplace as the weaker sex and treat 
54 examples of physical conduct range from a mere suggestive touch to rape  See Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 07
55 examples of verbal conduct include “innuendoes, suggestions and hints, sexual advances, comments 
with sexual overtones, sex-related jokes or insults, graphic comments about a person’s body made to 
that person or in their presence, enquiries about a person’s sex or even whistling at a person or group of 
persons”  See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 07
56 examples of non-verbal conduct include “gestures, indecent exposures or the display of sexually explicit 
pictures and objects”  See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 07
57 “[S]exual favouritism … occurs where a person in authority rewards only those who respond to his or her 
sexual advances ” See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 07-08  
58 “[H]ostile working environment harassment occurs when an abusive working environment is created in 
which an employee finds it difficult to work  This hostile working environment could be created by jokes, 
sexual propositions or other sexual innuendos which are offensive to an employee but not necessarily 
directed against that employee as a person … This means that this form of harassment does not depend on 
a relationship of actual power in the workplace – it commonly takes place between employees at the same 
level …” See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 208  See also Welsh “Gender and Sexual Harassment” 
999 Annu Rev Sociol 69 70
59 In instances of sexual harassment, the harasser can also abuse informal power  See Carle 006 Duke 
J Gender L & Pol’y 04  Grogan 004 Employment Law 5 explained, with reference to the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Entrot v BASF Corporation 003 WL 795, that an important consideration with 
regard to power in sexual harassment is whether the victim reasonably perceived the harasser to hold 
such (actual or informal) power  The author further stated that “[t]his approach shifts the focus from 
whether power is actually exercised by the harasser, to how it is perceived by the victim…it suggests that 
victims are induced to suffer the unwanted attentions of harassers for fear that their working lives will be 
adversely affected by denial of some benefit or some prejudicial consequence if they protest”  
60 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 07 (emphasis added)  See also Welsh 999 Annu Rev Sociol 70
6 The Politics of Sexual Harassment: A Comparative Study of the United States, the European Union, and 
Germany (007)  (emphasis added)  
6 Carle 006 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 04, with reference to Robbins, pointed out that the terms power and 
authority are frequently confused: “[A]uthority [is] the right to act, or command others to act … When 
we use the term “power”, we mean an individual’s capacity to influence decisions  As such, authority 
is actually part of the larger concept of power; that is the ability to influence based on an individual’s 
legitimate position, can affect decisions, but does not require authority to have such influence ” 
5 STeLL LR 008 
them accordingly.63 Sexual harassment therefore flourishes in the presence of 
power imbalance. This power imbalance is illustrated by the labour market 
statistics compiled by the Department of Labour,64 which clearly illustrate 
the reality that men tend to be the managers with the accompanying power, 
while women are the subordinate clerks. The 995 statistics revealed 77.8% of 
managers to be men, while women ruled the clerical area of the labour market 
with 63.9%.65 005 saw 69.4% of clerks being women, while men won the 
manager’s race with 70.8%.66
This article accordingly bases its argument on the reality that political 
parties, which bear the democratic responsibility of being the voice of the 
people, should in particular guard women from gender and power imbalances 
within their own power spheres. Due to the fact that the doctrine of vicari-
ous liability has previously been identified as a vehicle for the promotion of 
justice,67 there is merit in identifying it as a method for legally holding a 
political party socially responsible for the consequences flowing from a spe-
cial political power relationship that falls within the ambit of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability. This approach is plausible in the constitutional context of 
South Africa’s attempts to realise public accountability and further autonomy 
through declarations of “equality, dignity, freedom, [and] mutual respect”.68
The realisation of these ideals calls for the conversion of theoretical rights 
into practical protection through the imposition of vicarious liability, espe-
cially when one considers Gqola’s69 accusation that South Africa’s stance to 
and dialogues regarding gender issues are not liberal enough:
“‘[W]omen’s empowerment’ is discussed in ways that are not transformative … women are not 
empowered. Indicators of disempowerment are … rampant sexual harassment … the dominant talk 
of ‘empowerment of women’ expects women to conform and become ‘honorary men’ … rather than 
altering the formal workplace into a space that is more receptive to women70 … As South Africans, 
we need a psychological liberation from patriarchy – to learn to engage as partners across genders, to 
respect women’s bodily autonomy … But no gender-progressive country, psychological liberation or 
63 Welsh 999 Annu Rev Sociol 76 explained that sexual harassment, when considered through the socio-
cultural model of sociological analysis, is viewed as “a product of culturally legitimated power and status 
differences between men and women…[an explanation which fits with the] ‘dominance’ model that empha-
sizes sexual harassment’s origins in patriarchal society … [as it] is perceived to be an outgrowth of the 
gender socialization process and is a mechanism by which men assert power and dominance over women 
both at work and in society”  The author further stated that “[p]roponents of this approach emphasize gender 
as a key predicator of who is at risk of harassment, in light of empirical evidence that women experience 
more harassment than men”  Uggen & Blackstone “Sexual Harassment as a Gendered Expression of Power” 
004 American Sociological Review 64 84 noted that “MacKinnon’s theory and more recent feminist work 
suggest that power and masculinity explain the social distribution of harassment experiences”  
64 Department: Labour, Republic of South Africa “Women in the South African Labour Market 1995-2005” 
http://www labour gov za (accessed 6 March 007)  
65 http://www labour gov za 4
66 http://www labour gov za 4
67 Wicke “Vicarious Liability: Not Simply A Matter of Legal Policy” 1998 Stell LR 
68 Roederer “The Constitutionally Inspired Approaches to Police Accountability for Violence against Women 
in the U S  and South Africa: Conservation versus Transformation” 2005 Tul J Comp & Int’L L 9 38
69 “The Hype of Women’s Empowerment” Mail and Guardian Online (006--7) http://www mg co za 
(accessed 6 March 007)
70 In R v Morgantaler 988  SCR 30 par 40 the Court similarly noted that “[t]he history of the struggle for 
human rights from the eighteenth century on has been the history of men struggling to assert their dignity and 
common humanity against an overbearing state apparatus … [but] more recent struggle for women’s rights 
has been a struggle to eliminate discrimination to achieve a woman’s place in man’s world”  See also Albertyn 
“Women’s Rights” http://www genderstats org za/documents/Women’sRights pdf (accessed 5 March 007)
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national freed zone will be accessible without an honest look at our society … We can learn how to 
value ours and others’ freedom and pay attention to the histories that have brought us here.”
In present day democratic South Africa, neither the public nor the 
private sphere of our society has actively shed the historic shackles of double 
standards and power imbalances which burden women. Our political public 
figures are all the more to blame for this gender crime due to the opportu-
nity their positions grant them to change societal views and conceptions. 
unfortunately, as Mtintso7 pointed out, “[y]ou find there are comrades who 
bow to the question of gender equality, but in terms of their own behaviour 
are quite different”.
Where a political party appoints one of its members as its chief whip, it 
creates “a relationship of actual power in the hands of one party”.7 Therefore, 
in the words of Carle,73 the chief whip’s
“[c]loseness to the ‘power core’ results from … access to or relationships with the key [political party] 
managers or possession of key organizational information and resources”.
Such a relationship specifically creates the possibility of an imbalance of 
power where the chief whip is a male and the administrative assistants of 
the party are women. This makes the risk of abuse of power in the form of 
unwanted and unwelcome sexual advances on which sexual harassment flour-
ishes a reality and therefore threatens transformative empowerment of women 
as promised by our democratic society if no legal safeguards and constraints, 
such as an extended or revised doctrine of vicarious liability, are put in place 
to counter such a risk of abuse.74
3  Master-servant relationship
The relationship between a political party and its chief whip can arguably 
be considered to be one akin to that of an employment relationship that exists 
between a master and servant.75 This is because the chief whip acts as a repre-
sentative of the political party in Parliament. One should not halt the enquiry 
merely because a political party is not traditionally the “master” of its chief 
whip in terms of employment law. This, however, does not necessarily mean 
that the inquiry will be an uncomplicated undertaking. As Kahn76 noted, for
7 As quoted in Gqola Mail and Guardian Online (006--7)
7 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 07
73 006 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 04-05
74 This implementation of the doctrine of vicarious liability is not that farfetched, as the Supreme Court of 
the united States declared in Faragher v City Boca Raton 998 54 uS 775, in an opinion delivered by 
Souter J who stated that the rationale for placing harassment within the scope of vicarious liability where 
supervisory authority is present is found in the consideration of “fairness”, because fairness requires that 
the burden must fall on the employer in such instances where social behaviour of the like is foreseeable  
The Court also referred to Harper, James & Gray Law of Torts (986) 40-4 where the authors stated that 
“the leading Torts treatise has put it, [that] ‘the integrating principle’ of respondeat superior is ‘that the 
employer should be liable for those faults that may be fairly regarded as risks of his business, whether they 
are committed in furthering it or not’”  (Emphasis added)
75 In Majrowski v Guy’s and St. Thomas’ NHS Trust 006 uKHL 34 para 7 the House of Lords acknowl-
edged that “[t]o a limited extent vicarious liability may also exist outside the employment relationship, for 
instance, in some cases of agency”  
76 985 U Pa L Rev 440
54 STeLL LR 008 
“those courts that have dealt with respondeat superior doctrine in cases of alleged injuries by volun-
teers, finding a master-servant relationship has been the most troublesome part of the analysis”.
When dealing with volunteers, and therefore also with members of political 
parties, three common law conditions have to be met before such a compli-
cated relationship can be established:
the right to control must lie with the master with regard to his or her ser- 
vant’s physical conduct;77
it must be ascertained that the master consented78 to the services offered 
by the servant;79 and
the benefit80 that the master stands to gain from said services must be fore-
seeable to him or her.8
With regard to the first requirement, it is interesting to note that at one 
stage in South Africa’s legal history, control was regarded as the decisive 
consideration in confirming the existence of a special relationship such as that 
of an employer and employee.8 In Midway Two Engineering & Construction 
Services v Transnet Bpk,83 Nienaber JA, however, described the “control test” 
as a simplistic,84 outdated, discredited fiction.85 This description did not oust 
the consideration of control, but changed its status to but one factor to be 
considered in the identification of an employment relationship.86
In situations where an attempt is made to establish a relationship akin to 
that of an employment relationship, it is difficult to prove the existence of the 
right to control when dealing with factual situations involving individuals 
77 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440  In Regina v Walker 858 7 LJMC 07, Baron Braamwell set out the control 
test as the original criterion for the establishment of an employment relationship  This test was expressed 
in Hôpital Notre-Dame de l’Espérance v Laurent 978  SCR 605 63 as meaning that “the essential 
criterion of employer-employee relations is the right to give orders and instructions to the employee 
regarding the manner in which to carry out his work”  See also Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada 
Inc 00 SCC 59 para 37
78 It is not required of the master to clearly and openly consent to the services being offered to establish a 
special relationship akin to that of an employment relationship  Consent on the master’s side can merely 
be implied  See Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44
79 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440
80 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44, with reference to Baxter v Morningside Inc 974 5 P d 946 949, noted 
that “[b]y fulfilling a need of the organization, the volunteer’s work benefits the organization”  
8 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440
8 “Control” in this sense does not only include actual factual control, but can also include circumstances 
where the capacity or right to control exists  See Neethling et al Deliktereg 40
83 998 3 SA 7 (SCA)
84 30 years prior to Nienaber JA’s judgment in Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services, Atiyah 
in his 967 work, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts 4, already criticised the control test as having 
“an air of deceptive simplicity”  See Atiyah as referred to in Ontario Ltd v Sagaz 00 SCC 59 para 38  
85 See also Neethling et al Deliktereg 40  In Metwa v Minister of Health 989 3 SA 600 (D) 605 Nienaber 
J stated: “The degree of supervision and control which is exercised by the person in authority over him 
is no longer regarded as the sole criterion to determine whether someone is a servant or something else  
The deciding factor is the intention of the parties to the contract, which is to be gathered from a variety of 
facts and factors  Control is merely one of the indicia to determine whether or not a person is a servant or 
an independent worker ” 
86 Neethling et al Deliktereg 40  In Van der Berg v Coopers and Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd 00  SA 
242 (SCA) 258, Smalberger JA proclaimed: “In Midway Two Engineering and Construction Services v 
Transnet Bpk … this Court indicated a preference for a broader, multi-faceted test that took into account 
all relevant factors, including questions of policy and fairness, to determine issues of vicarious liability  
There is, therefore, no uniform or universal principle that governs each and every case involving vicari-
ous liability, although the element of control remains an important factor ”
•
•
•
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not receiving a salary from the master.87 It is helpful that only the presence 
of such a right is required according to American jurisprudence.88 The result 
is that it need not be proved that the master, being the political party in the 
situation under consideration, exercises the right to control.89 Furthermore, 
even though the position of members can be terminated in a similar manner 
as those of employees receiving a salary, that is not the decisive consideration 
when proving the master’s right of control over the former group.90 Therefore, 
the fact that Parliament signs the chief whip’s pay check need not be seen as 
an insurmountable obstacle. Instead, courts consider whether specific instruc-
tions were provided by the master9 and determine the nature of the agreement 
between the parties to the special relationship when establishing the presence 
of the right to control.9 In the past, courts have also considered how the public 
perceives the master’s right to control acts of the servant and what steps the 
master took after the servant’s wrongful act had occurred.93 In this regard it 
is undeniable that the public perceives the chief whip of a political party as 
acting at the party’s pleasure and according to its doctrines and orders. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, in John Doe v Bennett,94 was of the view that 
the bishop exercised control over the priest accused of misconduct in that 
case.95 The Court considered this to be so seeing that the bishop, in addition 
to the fact that he had the power to remove the priest, also had the power 
to determine the priest’s assignment and to discipline the priest.96 This gave 
the bishop extensive control over the priest and created a sufficiently close 
relationship.97 In the same manner, a political party assigns the chief whip his 
“voice” in Parliament and has the power to discipline him.
It is therefore clear that, although difficult, it is possible to establish the 
existence of a master-servant relationship between a political party and its 
chief whip, although it does not fit precisely into what is generally considered 
to be the default mould for an employer-employee relationship. In Hollis v 
Vabu (Pty) Ltd,98 the Australian High Court noted that where a relationship 
does not fit precisely into such an established dichotomy
87 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440
88 Marvel v United States 79 F d 507 54 (0th Cir 983); Coleman v Board of Education 978 383 A d 
75 79  See also Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440
89 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 440
90 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44
9 In Baxter v Morningside Inc 974 5 P d 946 949 the Court found that, for the right to control to vest 
in the master, direct supervision was not required  It was enough that there was agreement regarding the 
objective, destination and particulars of the servant-volunteer’s task  See also Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 
44
9 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44
93 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44  
94 004 SCC 7  This case before the Supreme Court of Canada concerned the abuse of a number of boys by 
a Roman Catholic parish priest  The Court had to consider whether the church could be held vicariously 
liable for the sexual misconduct of the priest  The Roman Catholic episcopal Corporation of St George’s 
was held vicariously liable by the trail judge, while it dismissed the claim against the church  On appeal, 
the Court upheld the dismissal of the action against the latter, but the majority held the former party 
directly, rather than vicariously, liable
95 Para 7
96 Para 7
97 Para 7
98 00 ATC 4508; 00 07 CLR   In this case the Court had to consider whether there existed an employ-
ment relationship between independent couriers and a courier company
56 STeLL LR 008 
“… it seems a better approach to develop the principles concerning vicarious liability in a way that 
gives effect to modern social conditions … [seeing that] the genius of the common law is that the first 
statement of a common law rule or principle is not its final statement … [as] contours of rules and 
principles expand and contract with experience and changes in social conditions”.99
Therefore it seems arguable that the vicarious liability principles developed 
in the case of volunteers and non-profit organisations by foreign courts to 
establish a special relationship akin to that of an employment relationship can 
in similar fashion be extended to allow for the establishment of such a special 
master-servant relationship between a political party and its chief whip.
4  Scope of employment
It has been argued above that the special relationship between a political 
party and its chief whip is akin to that of an employment relationship. In this 
regard the scope of the chief whip’s services or “employment” is an important 
consideration.00 The presence of vicarious liability on the part of the politi-
cal party will mainly depend on the nature of the chief whip’s activity that 
brought about the wrong for which the liability could potentially be attributed 
to the political party.0 Within the special relationship which exists between 
a political party and its chief whip it is therefore a complex issue to determine 
whether a chief whip’s wrongful act of sexual harassment falls within the 
course or scope of employment. The complexity of this vicarious liability 
requirement has given rise to judicial creativity as revealed by Corbett JA in 
Ngubetole v Administrator, Cape:0
“Because of … [the] flexibility or lack of precision in the concept of ‘course of employment’ in 
the sphere of vicarious liability, the Courts … have devised various tests for determining whether 
a particular act, or course of conduct, on the part of a servant falls within or without the course of 
his employment. Some of these tests are of broad, general application, others are more suited to the 
particular situations for which they were devised.”03
The most noteworthy of these tests are the standard test and the risk test. 
The standard test04 is traditionally favoured. In terms of this test an employer 
only incurs vicarious liability for the misconduct of an employee if the mis-
conduct is committed while acting, or attempting to act, for the benefit of the 
employer.05 Therefore the misconduct will fall within the scope of employ-
99 Para 7 (emphasis added)  See also Forstaff Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) 004 
ATC 4758 para 60
00 Sykes 988 Harv L Rev 563
0 Sykes 988 Harv L Rev 563
0 975 3 SA  (A) 9
03 Kahn 985 U Pa L Rev 44- 443 similarly explained that “[t]he tests for scope of employment are varied 
and complex…the emphasis is on how others perceive the relation”  
04 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 00  SA 37 
(SCA) 378 phrased this test as follows: “The standard test for vicarious liability of a master for the delict 
of a servant is whether the delict was committed by the employee while acting in the course and scope 
of his employment  The inquiry is frequently said to be whether at the relevant time the employee was 
about the affairs, or business, or doing the work of, the employer…It should not be overlooked, however, 
that the affairs of the employer must be related to what the employee was generally employed or specifi-
cally instructed to do ” See also Whitcher “Two Roads to an Employer’s Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Harassment: S v Grobler Bpk en ’n Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security CC” 2004 ILJ 907 909
05 Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 7
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ment if an employee is not acting in his or her own interest.06 This standard 
test contains both a subjective and an objective perspective.07 The subjective 
element looks towards the intent of the servant that committed the wrongful 
act, whilst the objective element08 places the emphasis on the establishment 
of a causal09 link between the action of the servant and the business of the 
master.0 At this stage, political parties might argue (with the focus on the 
subjective intent element) that acts of sexual harassment committed by a chief 
whip do not fall within the duties prescribed to him and therefore a chief 
whip guilty of such misconduct does so on a “frolic of his own”. The House 
of Lords in Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co revised this restrictive view, as it is 
not “in tune with the needs of society”. Judicially therefore a broader view 
of the “scope of employment”3 called for “an intense focus on the [objec-
tive] connection between the nature of the employment and the tort of the 
employee”.4 Therefore, where the wrongful actions of a servant can be suffi-
ciently linked to the general nature of his services it is possible for a master to 
be held vicariously liable for those actions.5 Similarly, the Supreme Court of 
Canada in John Doe v Bennett6 affirmed the fact that churches, dioceses and 
episcopal corporations can be held vicariously liable for the misconduct of a 
servant, even where that servant’s actions are in opposition with the entity’s 
06 Para 7l; Minister of Police v Rabie 986  SA 7 (A) 34  See also Neethling et al Deliktereg 404
07 Neethling et al Deliktereg 404
08 The objective element looks to establish a causal connection between the employment activities associ-
ated with the master’s business and the servant’s wrongful action  In this regard Sykes 988 Harv L Rev 
571 explained that there is in fact an assumption at work that the business of the master “caused” the 
wrongful acts committed by the servant  He, however, showed that this assumption did not create an 
inflexible objective approach as the “cause” is still made dependent of the context of every factual situa-
tion  Sykes further noted that a distinction could be drawn between situations where the master’s business 
fully or partially caused the wrongful acts of a servant  See Seavy Handbook of the Law of Agency (964) 
48 as quoted in Sykes 988 Harv L Rev 57-57
09 Sykes 988 Harv L Rev 571 pointed out that “[t]he legal meaning of the term “cause” depends upon 
context”  According to Seavy Handbook of the Law of Agency 48, wrongful actions fall within the scope 
of employment if “it can be said rationally that the employment is the primary cause of the [wrongful act 
or omission]”  See Sykes 1988 Harv L Rev 583
0 Roederer “The Constitutionally Inspired Approach to Vicarious Liability in Cases of Intentional Wrongful 
Acts by the Police: One Small Step in Restoring the Public’s Trust in The South African Police Service” 
005 SAJHR 575 595  In Minister of Police v Rabie 986  SA 7 (A) 34 the Appeal Court phrased the 
standard test as follows: “It seems clear that an act done by a servant … for his own interest and purposes, 
although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course and scope of his employment, and 
that in deciding whether an act by the servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the servant’s 
[subjective] intention … On the other hand, if there is nevertheless [objectively] a sufficiently close link 
between the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his master, the master 
may yet be liable … And it may be useful to add that ‘… a master  is liable even for acts which he has not 
authorized provided that they are so connected with acts which he has authorized that they may rightly be 
regarded as modes – although improper modes – of doing them …’ ” See also Neethling et al Deliktereg 
404
 9 AC 76  See also Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 7  
 Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 7  However, keep in mind that the Court in Bugge v 
Brown 1919 26 CLR 110 117-118 per Isaacs J explained that the “scope of employment” is a phrase used 
to “to indicate the just limits of a master’s responsibility for the wrongdoing of his servant” as “the law 
recognizes that it is equally unjust to make the master responsible for every act which the servant chooses 
to do”
3 In that an employer may be held vicariously liable for the misconduct of an employee who acts to his own 
benefit
4 Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 7
5 Neethling et al Deliktereg 406
6 004 SCC 7  
58 STeLL LR 008 
religious belief and doctrines.7 Therefore it can similarly be argued that situ-
ations may exist where, regardless of the fact that the chief whip’s power was 
not bestowed on him with the aim of furthering his sexual advances towards 
other vulnerable persons (such as the political party’s female administrative 
assistants), but rather to further the political party’s interest, the party may still 
be held vicariously liable for the damages suffered by the victim. Moreover, a 
political party will not succeed in arguing that the personal nature of sexual 
harassment places it outside the scope of employment. The House of Lords in 
Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust8 pointed out that although
“[i]t is true that this new wrong usually comprises conduct of an intensely personal character between 
two individuals … this feature may also be present with other wrongs which attract vicarious liability, 
such as assault”.
Therefore, as stated by the Constitutional Court in NK v Minister of Safety 
and Security,9
“an intentional deviation from duty does not automatically mean that an employer will not be 
liable”.
The vicarious liability test found in the risk theory is complementary to 
this view of the Constitutional Court. In its most simple form the doctrine of 
vicarious liability can be described as a form of risk allocation.0 According 
to this approach, a master who determines the circumstances of employment 
and thereby creates a risk of wrongful acts occurring, will bear the burden 
of being vicariously liable for those wrongful acts if committed by his or 
her servants. Whitcher notes that the cardinal question in determining 
liability on risk “would be whether, in fairness, the [master] … could be said 
to have assumed the specific risk that materialized”. This approach has not 
escaped criticism and has been accused of confusing the actual context of 
the doctrine with the rationale3 for its existence.4 Neethling, Potgieter & 
Visser5 nevertheless argue that it should be possible to hold a master vicari-
ously liable for the wrongful actions of a servant if the appointment of that 
7 White “Supreme Court of Canada Brings Clarity to Vicarious Liability of Churches in Canada” 2005 
Church Law Bulletin http://www carters ca  3 (accessed  December 006)
8 006 uKHL 34 para 5
9 005 6 SA 49 (CC) paras 5-6.
0 White 005 Church Law Bulletin   
 In contrast to the standard test, the risk theory is the more controversial alternative for determining 
whether the doctrine of vicarious liability finds application  See Whitcher 004 ILJ 908  In Minister of 
Police v Rabie 986  SA 7 (A) 34, Jansen JA stated (without commenting on the scope and bound-
aries of the risk theory) that this test shifts the focus of the enquiry from that of the intention of the 
employee and the nature of the possible link that can be established between the employee’s acts and his 
employment, to the principal object of detecting whether the employer created the risk within which the 
employee’s wrongful act fell  See also Neethling et al Deliktereg 406
 004 ILJ 908 909
3 In John Doe v Bennett 004 SCC 7 para 0, McLachlin CJ of the Supreme Court of Canada, commented 
on the rationale of the doctrine of vicarious liability: “Vicarious liability is based on the rationale that the 
person who puts a risky enterprise into the community may fairly be held responsible when those risks 
emerge and cause loss or injury to members of the public  effective compensation is a goal  Deterrence is 
also a consideration  The hope is that holding the employer or principal liable will encourage such persons 
to take steps to reduce the risk of harm in the future ” 
4 See also Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 99 4 SA 8 (A)
5 Deliktereg 407 n 35
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servant put him or her in a position that facilitated a wrongful act. Therefore, 
by empowering the servant, the master created the risk for which it would be 
reasonable, fair and just to hold him or her vicariously liable.6 It has also 
been held that excessive liability as a consequence of the possible broad inter-
pretation of the “scope of employment” can be limited by the identification of 
an employer’s “zone of risk”.7
Neethling et al8 proclaim that the risk theory should not be regarded as a 
separate theory to establish master-liability, as it is intrinsically linked to the 
enquiry that determines whether a servant acted within the scope of his or her 
employment. As the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry9 indicated:
“Applying … general considerations to sexual abuse by employees there must be a close connection30 
between what the employer was asking the employee to do (the risk created by the employer’s enter-
prise)3 and the wrongful act. It must be possible to say that the employers significantly increased 
the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position and requiring him to perform the 
assigned tasks.” 3
The Court noted further that, in the correct application of this approach, 
an investigation of “the employee’s specific duties and … whether they gave 
rise to sexual opportunities for wrongdoing”33 has to be undertaken. In this 
context, “risk” is a factor to be considered (or at most a supplementary test) 
and does not replace the subjective-objective link to be established.34
In John Doe v Bennett,35 the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the 
power imbalance36 between the parish priest and the community created a 
6 Neethling et al Deliktereg 407 n 35
7 According to this argument, vicarious liability could be imposed upon a master whose business could be 
seen as a factor contributing to the cause of the wrongful act committed by the servant and the deviation 
from the servant’s instructions or duties in the commitment of that act could be identified as probable 
given the nature of the servant’s employment  See Sykes 988 Har L Rev 583 n 48
8 Deliktereg 407
9 999  SCR 534 para 46  In casu the Court rejected the argument that the public interest prescribes that 
non-profit organisations should be protected from such liability and found that the relationship between 
the association and the counsellor was sufficiently close and that the misconduct of the counsellor was 
a manifestation of the risk inherent in the association’s operations  The Court (para 46) summarised 
its approach to the doctrine of vicarious liability as follows: “[T]he test for vicarious liability for an 
employee’s sexual abuse of a client should focus on whether the employer’s enterprise and empower-
ment of the employee materially increased the risk of the sexual assault and hence the harm  The test 
must not be applied mechanically, but with a sensitive view to the policy considerations that justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability – fair and efficient compensation for wrong and deterrence  This requires 
trial judges to investigate the employee’s specific duties and determine whether they gave rise to special 
opportunities for wrongdoing  Because of the peculiar exercises of power and trust that pervade cases 
such as child abuse, special attention should be paid to the existence of a power or dependency relation-
ship, which on its own often creates a considerable risk of wrongdoing ” 
30 This refers to the objective element in the standard test
3 In the situation under discussion, this can be equated to the furtherance of a political party’s political 
agenda as well as to the specific role a chief whip plays in this “enterprise” of the political party
3 emphasis added
33 Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 46  See also LEW v United Church of Canada 005 BCSC 564 para 53
34 Neethling et al Deliktereg 407
35 004 SCC 7  
36 With regard to the establishment of vicarious liability, the Supreme Court of Canada in John Doe v 
Bennett para  also noted that “[t]he employer’s control over the employee’s activities is one indication 
of whether the employee is acting on his or her employer’s behalf … [a]t the heart of the inquiry lies the 
question of power and control by the employer: both that exercised over and that granted to the employee”  
The Court followed by stating that “[w]here this power and control can be identified, the imposition of 
vicarious liability will compensate fairly and effectively”  
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risk that led to the boys in the community being sexually assaulted by their 
priest. With regard to this risk the Court explained that
“[w]hile Bennett had a particularly forceful personality, the root of his power over his victims lay in 
his role as a priest, conferred by the bishop”.37
Consequently, Bennett’s position gave him enormous power and standing 
in the community38 and within this lay dormant the risk of abuse.
In the Bennett case, however, the Court was dealing with a salaried priest 
whose relationship to the bishop was one akin to an employment relation-
ship. Yet in 005 a case was brought before the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia in LEW v United Church of Canada39 that concerned the question 
of a church’s vicarious liability for the acts of sexual abuse against children 
committed by one of its elders who was also a lay minister and in effect a 
volunteer. The Court found that the situation in casu was distinguishable from 
that in the Bennett case.40 This was so due to the fact that, unlike the priest 
in the Bennett case who had authority (and therefore also the power) to direct 
altar boys, the elder’s duties in the LEW case were limited to Sunday services 
before the congregation.4 Therefore, the fact that the church allowed him to 
act as a volunteer minister did not create a risk as in the Bennett case where 
he could abuse his power to commit wrongful actions. The importance of this 
judgment lies in the fact that the church did not escape vicarious liability as a 
result of the fact that the elder was a volunteer. Liability was diverted due to 
the fact that the elder’s duties did not give him the power and opportunity to 
come into direct contact with the children of the congregation more so than 
any other member of the community. The decisive factor was therefore that 
the church did not create the risk.
According to a recent statement by the ANC National Disciplinary 
Committee in December 006 (as a response to the removal of the party’s 
chief whip from his position after allegations of sexual harassment), its chief 
whip’s status
“gave him enormous power and authority … [as he] effectively ran the parliamentary office, inter-
acted with political parties in the National Assembly, disciplined members of the National Assembly 
and played a leading role in the Caucus and the Political Committee of Parliament”.4
Therefore, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Bennett case, a chief whip’s position, as bestowed upon him or her by a 
political party, grants that person great power and standing. Lurking behind 
this status is the risk of abuse of power, such as found in instances of sexual 
harassment.
37 Para 3  According to the trial judge (quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal of Canada), 
“[t]he awe in which Father Bennett was held by the community at large contributed to his ability to control 
his victims”  
38 Para 3
39 005 BCSC 564  
40 Paras 69-7
4 Para 66
4 “Statement of the ANC National Disciplinary Committee in the Case of Mbulelo Goniwe” (14 December 
006)  
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Consequently, seeing as both the objective sufficient link requirement 
and the risk theory targets relevant considerations for the application of the 
doctrine of vicarious liability to a set of facts, the Supreme Court of Canada 
(in line with its earlier judgment in the Bazley case) opted in Blackwater v 
Plint43 to follow an approach incorporating the objective element into the risk 
theory. The Court then identified the following factors to be considered when 
determining whether a servant acted within the “scope of his employment”:
“Vicarious liability may be imposed where there is a significant connection between the conduct 
authorized by the employer or controlling agent and the wrong.  Having created or enhanced the 
risk of the wrongful conduct, it is appropriate that the employer or operator of the enterprise be 
held responsible, even though the wrongful act may be contrary to its desires … When determining 
whether vicarious liability should be imposed, the court bases its decision on several factors, which 
include: (a) the opportunity afforded by the employer’s enterprise for the employee to abuse his 
power; (b) the extent to which the wrongful act furthered the employer’s interests; (c) the extent to 
which the employment situation created intimacy or other conditions conducive to the wrongful act; 
(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; and (e) the vulnerability 
of potential victims.”44
In similar fashion, O’Regan J, writing for the Constitutional Court in the 
NK case45 (while emphasising the right to equality, dignity and freedom and 
security of the person), noted that the test set in Minister of Police v Rabie46 is 
very similar to the test employed in common law jurisdictions and proclaimed 
a preference for the risk theory.47 The Court further emphasised that this test 
for vicarious liability should be flexible in its application and
“approached with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution in mind [and] ... incorporate … 
constitutional norms … [as the risk test in its application] should not offend the Bill of Rights or be at 
odds with our constitutional order”.48
5  The flexible constitutional perspective
Courts have through the years emphasised that the doctrine of vicarious 
liability is designed to adapt to society’s need for the regulation of certain high 
risk relationships.49 In Lister v Hesley Hall Limited,50 the House of Lords 
articulated that vicarious liability is an imposed legal responsibility that bal-
ances the two conflicting policies of social interest and undue burden. Although 
such a legal responsibility is recognised, its scope is not set in stone, as
43 005 3 SCR 3
44 Para 0
45 005 6 SA 49 (CC)
46 986  SA 7 (A).
47 See Roederer “The Constitutionally Inspired Approaches to Police Accountability for Violence Against 
Women in the U S  and South Africa: Conservation Versus Transformation” 2005 Tul J Comp & Int’L L 
9 35
48 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para 44
49 See Hollis v Vabu (Pty) Ltd 2001 ATC 4508; (2001) 207 CLR 21 para 72: “[T]he genius of the common 
law is that the first statement of a common law rule or principle is not its final statement  The contours of 
rules and principles expand and contract with experience and changes in social conditions ” 
50 00 uKHL  para 4  This case referred to the decisions in Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 and Jacobi 
v Griffiths 1999 2 SCR 570 as landmark decisions that are both “luminous and illuminating”  See also 
Grobler v Naspers Bpk 004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 54
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“[w]hat was once presented as a legal principle has degenerated into a rule of expediency, imper-
fectly defined, and changing its shape before our eyes under the impact of social and political 
conditions”.5
Therefore, in line with this traditional perspective, value judgments and 
policy considerations would have informed the development of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability,5 but regard must be had to the fact that
“there is [no] reason of principle or policy which can be of substantial guidance in the resolution of 
the problem of applying the rule in a particular case [as] … [t]heory may well justify the existence 
of the concept, but it is hard to find guidance from any underlying principle which will weigh in the 
decision whether in a particular case a particular wrongful act by the employee should or should not 
be regarded as falling within the scope of employment”.53
As a result of the intrinsic flexibility of the doctrine of vicarious liabil-
ity, which Corbett JA pointed out in the earlier judgment of Ngubetole v 
Administrator, Cape,54 the doctrine consequently developed in response to 
the demands of public interest.
The earlier discussion of the common law criteria for the application of the 
doctrine of vicarious liability indicates that it is indeed sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the special relationship which exists between a political party 
and its chief whip. However, regard must be had to the Constitutional Court’s 
warning in Pharmaceutical Manufactures of SA: In re Ex Parte President of 
the RSA.55 In that case the Court56 emphasised that the common law can-
not be viewed as a law upon its own, separate from the Constitution. South 
Africa’s new constitutional dispensation requires (as indicated by the approach 
to vicarious liability in the NK case57) that the law in force at the time of the 
commencement of the Constitution be viewed “through the prism of the Bill of 
Rights”.58 Section 39() grants such a prism, in that it obliges courts, tribunals 
and forums, “when developing the common law … [to] promote the spirit, pur-
5 Kilboy v South Eastern Fire Area Joint Committee 95 SC 80 85  Holmes Common Law (95) 5 also 
commented that “[t]he reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set 
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for  Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems 
to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things: and then the rule adapts itself to the new 
reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career ” See also Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 
00 uKHL  para 34  
5 As noted by Lord Reid in Stavely Iron & Chemical Co Ltd v Jones 1956 AC 627 643: “[t]he doctrine of 
vicarious liability has not grown from any clear, logical or legal principle but from social convenience and 
rough justice”  See also Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 35
53 Lister v Hesley Hall Limited 00 uKHL  para 35
54 975 3 SA  (A) 9
55 000  SA 674 (CC)
56 Paras 44-49: “There are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same subject-matter, each having 
similar requirements … There is only one system of law  It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject 
to constitutional control …The common law supplements the provisions of the written Constitution but 
derives its force from it  It must be developed to fulfil the purposes of the Constitution and the legal order 
it proclaims – thus, the command that law be developed and interpreted by the courts to promote the 
‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ ” 
57 005 6 SA 49 (CC)  This was a case where the Constitutional Court held the Minister of Safety and 
Security vicariously liable for the actions of police officers that kidnapped and raped a woman who 
approached them for assistance when she found herself stranded
58 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty): In Re Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 00  SA 545 (CC) para   See also Daniels v Campbell NO 
004 5 SA 33 (CC) para 44  S 7() of the Constitution recognises the Bill of Rights as South Africa’s 
democratic cornerstone, with intrinsic values of human dignity, equality and freedom
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port and objects of the Bill of Rights”.59 This grants South African courts the 
opportunity to develop the common law scope of vicarious liability to take into 
account society’s perspective of the severe problem of sexual harassment.
In the NK case,60 O’Regan J stated:
“[A]s a matter of law and social regulation, the principles of vicarious liability are principles which 
are imbued with social policy and normative content. Their application will always be difficult and 
will require what may be troublesome lines to be drawn by courts applying to them.”
With regard to the development of common law principles in the law of 
delict, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security6 proclaimed:
“under section 39() of the Constitution concepts such as ‘policy decisions and value judgments’ 
reflecting ‘the wishes … and the perceptions … of the people’ and ‘society’s notions of what justice 
demands’ might well have to be replaced, or supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of 
the objective value system embodied in the Constitution.”6
Denying the flexible doctrine of vicarious liability, a constitutional norma-
tive context (as indicated by the emphasised abstracts) leaves it foreign to the 
ideals of a democratic society. Only when this doctrine is clothed in constitutional 
colours and informed by the Constitution’s objective normative value system will 
the social and economic rationale underlying the doctrine gain meaning and pur-
pose63 in situations of sexual harassment such as the one under consideration.
In the 004 landmark decision of Grobler v Naspers Bpk,64 the Cape High 
Court took the first steps towards a common law expansion of the scope of 
vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases that embraces our new con-
stitutional dispensation and its accompanying objective normative system. 
Although the Court stated that the traditional position (ie that employers can 
only be held vicariously liable for the wrongful actions of their employees if 
such wrongful actions were committed “within the course and scope of their 
employment”) must be interpreted broadly to accommodate legal common law 
flexibility that allows for changing social and economic circumstances, along 
with policy considerations,65 the Court did not lose sight of the Constitution. 
59 In NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para  O’Regan J articulated that even though 
it is clear that the doctrine of vicarious liability is based on policy considerations, if the furtherance of the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom in a democratic society necessitates it, “the 
principle of vicarious liability [must be viewed] through the prism of section 39() of the Constitution … 
[and not merely characterised by] … the application of the common-law principle of vicarious liability as 
a matter of fact untrammelled by any considerations of law or normative principle”
60 Para  (emphasis added)
6 00 4 SA 938 (CC) para 56
6 emphasis added  In S v Makwanyane 995 3 SA 39 (CC) para 88, Chaskalson P also declared that 
“[p]ublic opinion may have some relevance to … [an] enquiry [as to constitutionality of the death pen-
alty], but in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour”  
63 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para 3
64 004 5 BLLR 455 (C)
65 It must be observed that McLachlin J in Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534 para 7 noted that “[a] focus on 
policy is not to diminish the importance of legal principle”  See also Jacobi v Griffiths 999  SCR 570 para 
9 and Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc 00 SCC 59 para 7  In Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries 
Canada Inc para 30 Major J (with reference to McLachlin J in Bazley v Curry 999  SCR 534) explained 
that the “[i]dentification of the policy consideration underlying the imposition of vicarious liability [how-
ever] assists in determining whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case …”
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The Court stated that, in the event that such a common law extension of its 
own accord is incorrect, section 39() warrants such a development for the 
promotion and protection of women’s right to dignity and freedom and secu-
rity of person.66 This stance of the Court in Grobler v Naspers Bpk 67 is 
evidence of the influence the Constitution’s objective value system has on 
legal reasoning in South Africa.
The objective value system imbedded in the democratic South Africa’s 
Constitution is an attempt to correct the injustices and human rights violations 
that represent the tragedy of apartheid. Apartheid generated and sustained 
the disempowerment of the majority of South Africa’s population. Due to the 
fact that the apartheid era is intrinsically linked to the reminiscences of abuse 
of power by authority figures, as well as organs of the State, “[i]t will take 
many years of strong commitment, sensitivity and labour”68 to eradicate the 
intrusions of the past, characterised by the
“intentional and persistent marginalisation, exploitation and oppression … and the pervasiveness of 
patriarchy to concretely shape severe patterns of social, economic and political vulnerability and 
deprivation in South Africa”.69
Modern day society’s need to address the problem of sexual harassment 
legally gains an extra dimension when viewed in South Africa’s historical 
context.
In the shadows of memories of unrestrained power, power abuse through acts 
of sexual harassment by public political figures who are supposed to uphold 
and promote the constitutional values so dear to the democratic society they 
represent, are all the more worrying. This is especially distressing as women, 
who are usually the victims, have first hand experience of social, economic 
and political deprivation through abuse of power. How can the public expect a 
political authority figure, such as a chief whip, to promote constitutional values 
in Parliament if he personally has no respect for those values when he infringes 
the values of and rights to human dignity, equality and freedom of another by 
making himself guilty of acts of sexual harassment? Therefore, as Roederer70 
stated with reference to the NK case,7 it needs to be considered whether
“the existing law of vicarious liability … further[s] these goals and the goals of South Africa’s demo-
cratic transition; … [whether] it live[s] up to the values and aspirations of the new constitutional order 
or … [whether] it need[s] to be developed to further these goals, values and aspirations?”
66 As articulated by Nel J in Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 527: “So ook behoort ons howe, 
na my mening, die ‘reël’ aan te pas ten einde uitvoering te gee aan die plig aan hulle opgelê om die reg 
op die ingebore waardigheid, die reg op vryheid en sekerheid van persoon en die reg op liggaamlike en 
psigiese integriteit van vrouens in die werkplek te beskerm en te bevorder ” 
67 004 5 BLLR 455 (C) 57
68 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 996 4 SA 67 (CC) 
para 43
69 Pieterse “What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 2005 SAPL 55 
57  However, as declared by Pieterse 005 SAPL 59, “[o]ne should of course guard against viewing 
South African history as a fixed, uni-dimensional ‘grand narrative’ which emphasises only certain 
aspects of its past in which various forms of societal oppression interacted and overlapped”  
70 005 SAJHR 578
7 005 6 SA 49 (CC)  
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As described in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution,7 our 
Constitution provides
“a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society … and a future founded on the recogni-
tion of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence”.
Political figures resorting to degrading and discriminatory practices of sex-
ual harassment post-994 demolish such a bridge brick by brick in full view 
of our democratic society. Such conduct clearly does not advance peaceful 
co-existence irrespective of sex or gender. The elimination of sexual harass-
ment and the development of a peaceful co-existence demand the respect of 
the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom, but in the 
words of Albertyn & Goldblatt,73 “this transformation project [also] involves 
the eradication of systematic forms of domination” such as the power (and 
gender) imbalance on which sexual harassment feeds. Seeing as eradica-
tion calls for active steps and not just passive abstention, the imposition of 
vicarious liability on political parties, where their power hungry chief whips 
threaten the values of our democratic society’s peaceful co-existence, cannot 
be regarded as too great a burden. The eradication of the domination of women 
by way of sexual harassment necessitates the promotion and protection of the 
equal dignity74 of women as a disadvantaged vulnerable group of victims.
The Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane75 stated that the importance 
of personal rights could not be emphasises too strongly:
“Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human 
beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.”
Turning a blind eye to the abuse of political power by a chief whip by way of 
acts of sexual harassment disregards the constitutional aim of promoting and 
protecting the “intrinsic worth of human beings” and women in particular due 
to their historical suppression by a patriarchal legal system.
The Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo76 also acknowledged equality’s importance as central to our consti-
tutional vision. In South Africa’s democratic history, the value and right of 
equality has transformed from its mere formal nature77 to a substantive 
content.78 In the light of the constitutional promotion and protection of 
substantive equality, sexual harassment cannot merely be removed from the 
7 Act 00 of 993
73 “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” 1998 
SAJHR 48 49
74 In essence the difference between dignity and equality as values and rights are found in the fact that 
as values they inform the interpretation of other rights, while their status as rights makes dignity and 
equality also enforceable under the Constitution  The same goes for the constitutional value of freedom 
and the rights associated with it
75 995 3 SA 39 (CC) para 38
76 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 74: “[I]n the light of our own particular history, and our vision for the future, a 
Constitution was written with equality at its centre  equality is our Constitution’s focus and its organising 
principle ” 
77 Formal equality demands that all people be treated similarly regardless of their differing circumstances  
78 See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 998  BCLR 57 para 
132: “Equality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact uniformity can be the enemy of equality  
equality means treating persons with equal concern and respect across difference  It does not presuppose 
the elimination or suppression of difference ” 
66 STeLL LR 008 
scope of the doctrine of vicarious liability by the argument that all men and 
women are formally equal in the workplace and theoretically able to protect 
their own interests equally. The reality of power imbalances makes the impact 
of uncontested and untamed sexual harassment all the more discriminatory 
against women due to their historical social oppression. Furthermore the 
right of women to freedom and security of their person as a personal right 
is informed by the value of human dignity and goes to the bodily and psy-
chological integrity of a person and is therefore blatantly infringed upon by 
sexual harassment by way of an attack on the victim’s personal autonomy.79
In the same transformative narrative that is envisaged by South Africa’s 
constitutional jurisprudence80 (as informed by the Constitution’s objective nor-
mative system)8 the common law doctrine of vicarious liability should merge 
its traditional elements with the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
Such a process should be undertaken in an attempt to redefine it in harmony 
with the Constitution. This redefinition needs to be done over time as the rel-
evant circumstances (such as the problem under discussion) present themselves 
due to the fact that transformation is an enormous and long-term project that 
necessitates “a complete reconstruction of the state and society”.8
Along with the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, our courts 
must not lose sight of the traditional African concept of ubuntu83 as intro-
duced to South Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence by the Constitutional 
Court in S v Makwanyane.84 Ubuntu conceptualises the fact that all South 
Africans are now part of an interdependent democratic community, unified 
under the Constitution, as
“[i]t recognises a person’s status as human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and 
acceptance from the members of the community … [m]ore importantly, it regulates the exercise of 
rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by 
all [and emphasises] … [r]espect for the dignity of every person [as] … integral to this concept”.85
This is in line with
“the worldview that underlies the risk theory of vicarious liability [that] sees the person as a coop-
erating member of the community … who is nurtured by that community and who has duties to the 
members of that community.”86
79 Nedelsky “Violence Against Women: Challenges to the Liberal State and Relational Feminism” in 
Shapiro & Hardin (eds) Political Order (998) 454 473; 477 pointed out that women cherish their personal 
autonomy  See S v Baloyi 000  BCLR 86 (CC) para 6
80 In this regard the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 998  SA 
765 (CC) para 8, declared as follows: “[T]o transform our society into one in which there will be human 
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order  For as long as these condi-
tions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring ” 
8 The rights of dignity, equality and freedom and security of the person are undeniably part of this 
system
8 Albertyn & Goldblatt 998 SAJHR 48 49  See also Pieterse 005 SAPL 59
83 Ubuntu as a traditional African jurisprudential concept is also reconcilable with the doctrine of vicarious 
liability, as the doctrine does not merely have common law roots, but can also be found in customary law  
See NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para 4 and n 30
84 995 3 SA 39 (CC)  Other cases in which the Constitutional Court made specific reference to the concept 
of ubuntu were Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa supra 
and Hoffmann v SA Airways 00  SA  (CC)  
85 S v Makwanyane 995 3 SA 39 (CC) paras 4-5  
86 Roederer 005 Tul J Comp & Int L 36
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Ubuntu, as pointed out by Pieterse,87 therefore visualises a society that 
embraces harmony, instead of individual gain. In contrast to this approach, 
sexual harassment focuses mainly on individual gain for the harasser at the 
expense of the inherent human dignity and psychological integrity of the 
victim. Arguably, political abuse of power is in conflict with the traditional 
philosophy of ubuntu as such power abuse goes towards individual gain instead 
of the promotion of societal interest. In theory, the promotion of societal inter-
est should be the aim of a political party democratically acting on behalf of 
the people.88 Consequently, with regard to the question under consideration, 
the traditional African concept of ubuntu is reconcilable with the risk theory 
and informs the traditional rationale for the doctrine of vicarious liability to 
harmonise it with the co-dependence of South Africa’s democratic society 
and its constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom.
6  Conclusion
If the difficulty that a chief whip is not a salaried employee of a political 
party can be overcome by establishing a special master-servant relationship, 
the flexible nature of the doctrine of vicarious liability, as informed by consti-
tutional norms, could result in a political party being held liable for wrongful 
actions of its chief whip committed within the scope of his employment.
This would be the case where the control, power and authority which the 
political party bestowed upon the chief whip within the scope of his duty to 
represent and further the party’s interests enabled him to abuse that control, 
power and authority. Such abuse could arguably be described as a risk that 
goes with the placement of political party members in prominent public posi-
tions. As they are then public figures, it would be in the public interest if a 
political party could be held liable for the realisation of such a risk.89 This 
possibility of vicarious liability ensuing on the side of political parties would 
in turn make them more observant of and vigilant with regard to the actions of 
prominent members. Therefore the possibility of incurring vicarious liability 
should serve as motivation for political parties to keep tight reins on their 
public political figures, such as a chief whip.
A political party also attracts this potential legal responsibility as a conse-
quence of the relationship between it and its chief whip, as the relationship is 
one akin to that between an employer and employee. The chief whip is placed 
87 “Traditional African Jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (004) 438 448  
88 Pieterse “Traditional African Jurisprudence” in Jurisprudence 448
89 In the statement following the former ANC chief whip’s disciplinary hearing, the ANC National 
Disciplinary Committee stated the following with regard to the public’s interest in the behaviour of par-
liamentary staff, such as a chief whip: “[A] representative is a public face …The more senior the post the 
greater the authority exercised by that person and the greater the responsibility  Such authority must be 
exercised with prudence and fairness … Parliament enjoys a special status in our Constitution  The public 
is therefore entitled to expect behaviour from its members which is above reproach  Parliamentary staff 
must treat members with courtesy and respect  Members must therefore show the same consideration  
Complaints from staff of bullying or harassment, including any allegation of sexual harassment, or any 
other inappropriate behaviour on the part of members must be taken seriously and investigated ” See 
“Statement of the ANC National Disciplinary Committee in the case of Mbulelo Goniwe” (14 December 
006)
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in his position by the political party to which he voluntarily applied for mem-
bership. The chief whip, as voluntary servant, holds office at the pleasure of 
the political party, as master. Furthermore, the chief whip’s primary function 
is to serve the political party by keeping the members of the political party 
in line with the will of the party and therefore his instructions as servant is 
to utilise the power the party has bestowed upon him to further that master’s 
interests. This warrants the inference that the right to control is present in this 
special relationship and in fact lies with the political party, but it also creates 
a risk that the power the political party so bestows and controls can be abused 
by its chief whip and can result in vicarious liability for the political party for 
misconduct in the form of sexual harassment committed by its chief whip.
If then in future a situation where a political party’s accountability for its 
chief whip’s wrongful act of sexual harassment has to be decided by the courts, 
the flexible scope of the doctrine of vicarious liability should be broadened (as 
has been done in Canadian jurisprudence in cases involving unpaid volun-
teers and clergy) in line with the constitutional obligation in section 39() to 
allow for this relationship to attract such liability. Nonetheless, the fact that a 
political party can be held vicariously liable in certain circumstances for the 
wrongful actions of its chief whip must not become an insurmountable burden 
for political parties. In a similar fashion as in section 60 of the employment 
equity Act,90 where allowance is made for an employer to escape vicari-
ous liability, South African courts should also grant the same escape route 
to political parties. If a political party “consult[s] all relevant parties and … 
take[s] the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct”9 and “is able to 
prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable” to prevent the abuse of 
power by its chief whip, then vicarious liability should not fall upon it.
The threat in ignoring such abuses of power lies in the fact that it will 
escalate to more such abuses and disregard for the rights and values of the 
Constitution, because
“domination always appears natural to those who possess it, and the law insidiously transforms the 
fact of domination into a legal right [as] … [i]nequality permeates some of our most cherished and 
long-standing laws and institutions”.9
Therefore, the advantage of employing the common law doctrine of vicari-
ous liability to fulfil the legal constitutional function of protecting “those 
whom nature did not place in a dominant position”93 and make political 
parties more conscious of the (ab)use of their delegated social power, must 
not be overlooked. In the words of O’Regan J in NK v Minister of Safety and 
Security,94 the above discussion
90 55 of 998
9 S 60() employment equity Act 55 of 998
9 L’Heureux-Dubé J of the Canadian Supreme Court as quoted in Albertyn & Goldblatt 998 SAJHR 48 
49  
93 L’Heureux-Dubé J of the Canadian Supreme Court as quoted in Albertyn & Goldblatt 998 SAJHR 48 
49  
94 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para 3
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“implies that courts, bearing in mind the values the Constitution seeks to promote, will decide [on 
a case by case basis] whether the case before it is of the kind which in principle should render … [a 
political party] liable”.
Courts should, however, keep in mind that the “deep-seated sense of 
justice”95 furthered by the doctrine of vicarious liability96 necessitates a 
finding that, in circumstances where a chief whip abuses his power to sexually 
harass a vulnerable administrative assistant of his political party, liability for 
damages should be borne by the political party. As the main source of the 
chief whip’s authority, the political party should be held liable for the emotional 
and pecuniary damages97 caused by him, as the political party’s servant, if it 
did not act accordingly to address the problem. If our courts are not willing 
to recognise that a power-relationship exists between a political party and its 
chief whip, they will be choosing to
“ignore the values of the Constitution … human rights, ubuntu, and the overall transformation of 
South African law and society … founded on equality, dignity, freedom, mutual respect, and caring 
cooperation in the achievement of self determination for all South Africans”.98
SUMMARY
This article argues that the South African doctrine of vicarious liability should be extended to bring 
it in line with international trends, in order to accommodate instances where members of political 
parties abuse their positions of power in sexual harassment scenarios. The fact that sexual harassment 
is unquestionably present in our society as well as in the conduct of political figures who abuse their 
power, necessitates legal transformation in South Africa if the progressive promotion of gender equal-
ity is to become a true characteristic of our country.
The flexible doctrine of vicarious liability can help realise this goal by making provision for special 
relationships, such as that between a political party and its chief whip, in accordance with common 
law requirements. These requirements include the presence of an employer-employee relationship, 
and the commission of a wrong by an employee acting within the scope of his employment.
It is argued that the relationship between a political party and its chief whip is akin to that between 
an employer and employee, in that a chief whip acts in accordance with the will of his political party 
when fulfilling his duties in Parliament. It is further explained that the mere fact that a chief whip is 
remunerated by Parliament does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle.
Thereafter, it is argued that the abuse of political power in the form of sexual harassment by a chief 
whip indeed falls within the scope of his employment. Furthermore, it is shown that if the flexible 
doctrine of vicarious liability is viewed within the context of constitutional values such as equality, 
freedom and dignity, as well as the constitutional duty to develop the common law in line with the 
Constitution in terms of section 39(), it becomes apparent that the doctrine must be interpreted so as 
to cover special relationships such as the one discussed.
95 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 005 6 SA 49 (CC) para 4
96 As informed by the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom and the promotion and 
protection of the interests of the democratic South African society
97 For an example of emotional and pecuniary damages suffered by victims of sexual harassment, see 
Grobler v Naspers Bpk 004 5 BLLR 455 (C) and Ntsabo v Real Security CC 004  BLLR 58 (LC)
98 Roederer 005 SALJ 606
